Zero Knowledge Proof part 1

In cryptography, a zero-information evidence or zero-information protocol is a technique through which one party (the prover) can show to some other party (the verifier) that a given announcement is real whilst the prover avoids conveying any extra records other than the reality that the announcement is certainly real. The essence of zero-information proofs is that it's miles trivial to show that one possesses information of positive records through absolutely revealing it; the venture is to show such ownership with out revealing the records itself or any extra records.[1]

If proving a announcement calls for that the prover own a few mystery records, then the verifier will now no longer be capable of show the announcement to every person else with out owning the name of the game records. The announcement being proved should consist of the declaration that the prover has such information, however with out inclusive of or transmitting the information itself withinside the declaration. Otherwise, the announcement might now no longer be proved in zero-information as it gives the verifier with extra records approximately the announcement through the quit of the protocol. A zero-information evidence of information is a unique case whilst the announcement is composed most effective of the reality that the prover possesses the name of the game records
Interactive zero-knowledge proofs require interaction between the individual (or computer system) proving their knowledge and the individual validating the proof.[1]

A protocol implementing zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge must necessarily require interactive input from the verifier. This interactive input is usually in the form of one or more challenges such that the responses from the prover will convince the verifier if and only if the statement is true, i.e., if the prover does possess the claimed knowledge. If this were not the case, the verifier could record the execution of the protocol and replay it to convince someone else that they possess the secret information. The new party's acceptance is either justified since the replayer does possess the information (which implies that the protocol leaked information, and thus, is not proved in zero-knowledge), or the acceptance is spurious, i.e., was accepted from someone who does not actually possess the information.