Truth, Power, and the Panopticon

I've been researching and analysing translated and important works by Foucault over the past few weeks. This week, I will finish that process by analysing Foucault's final significant work, which focuses on his investigations of Power.
The first lecture of James D. Faubion's Truth and Juridical Forms lecture series is the starting point for the book. Contrary to what is widely believed, Foucault starts this series by criticising the Marxists' approach to power. Power, in Foucault's view, is a system of games. Theoretically, his interpretation is also Nietzschean rather than Marxist. Anyone who asserts that Foucault was a Marxist philosopher either doesn't know much about his writings or is lying. According to Foucault, Power and Knowledge interact to produce new knowledge forms through a subject's instincts, emotions, and conflict (thus the Nietzschean foundation for Foucault's analysis of Power) (pp. 8–14). I believe what ought to It may be inferred from reading Foucault's first lecture on Power that the subject, particularly as it relates to his knowledge domains and fields, is as much a product of his surroundings as he shapes them (p. 15). Later in this examination, this conceptual link between the subject's environment, power, and knowledge will also be examined. "What I intend to show in these lectures is how, in fact, the political and economic conditions of existence are not a veil or an obstacle for the subject of knowledge but the means by which subjects of knowledge are formed, and hence are truth relations," is a concise translation of Foucault's main argument for this lecture series.

Foucault starts by looking at the power struggles of the ancient Greeks in order to prove his point. First, he claims that "the testing game" was the first power game played by the ancient Greeks (p. 18). The Iliad, a Homeric epic, serves as a reference point for this testing game. Later, the testing game is changed into a game of knowledge and power. The core of Foucault's analysis, which derives from his reading of Oedipus Rex, is this game of knowledge and power (p. 23).
Oedipus' problem, according to Foucault, was that he knew too much. Oedipus learned things by interacting with the world and doing research. Although he had humble beginnings, Oedipus eventually used his knowledge, skills, and abilities to accomplish what other men could not, which allowed him to rise to the highest position within a polis: King. His greatest strength and weakness are both defined by this knowledge, more notably his ability to see. He is dependent on knowledge because he acquired authority by his investigative methods and knowledge, thus he must know. He learns the truth while driven by the need to understand it and keep his authority; as a result, he is overthrown and removed from his throne, never to rise again (pp. 24–30).Oedipus' problem, according to Foucault, was that he knew too much. Oedipus learned things by interacting with the world and doing research. Although he had humble beginnings, Oedipus eventually used his knowledge, skills, and abilities to accomplish what other men could not, which allowed him to rise to the highest position within a polis: King. His greatest strength and weakness are both defined by this knowledge, more notably his ability to see. He is dependent on knowledge because he acquired authority by his investigative methods and knowledge, thus he must know. He learns the truth while driven by the need to understand it and keep his authority; as a result, he is overthrown and removed from his throne, never to rise again (pp. 24–30). This, according to Foucault, created a myth: where science and knowledge are found in their unadulterated truth, political power is no longer possible. By using a Nietzschean analysis, Foucault aims to shatter this illusion by demonstrating how these are both the result of and modified by a power struggle.

One of the more difficult but also crucial parts of this lecture series is the third portion of Truth and Juridical Forms. Foucault starts by demonstrating how the Germanic power struggles eventually replaced the Greek Inquisitorial practises when the Roman empire crumbled. The German power games, or legal games, were never public (no one spoke for the entire society), an act of war by one side against another, i.e., war by other means, and amenable to negotiation (pp. 35–35). The Germanic legal games, which predated the Roman legal games, served as the basis for feudal laws. Foucault asserts that the early Feudal laws were a test of truth, just like their Greek counterparts. The Feudal regulations included social examinations, formulaic or verbal tests, swearing-in ceremonies, and physical trials that served as a continuance of warfare (pp. 37–38). The Feudal tests of truth also had the following traits: they were binary, meaning that you could either accept them or reject them, which would result in an admission of defeat; you could either win or lose; the procedures were self-regulating; and it was (again) just another form of warfare (pp. 38–39).

What should be evident is that Foucault is establishing an apparent developmental pattern. The pattern exists as follows: Games of Might lead to Games of Analysis. What’s fascinating about Foucault’s analysis is that it suggests and outright states that the development of different schools of knowledge is rooted in the state’s or Power’s desire for control and command. The subjects of knowledge, thus, exist in an oscillatory and mutually dependent manner with Power.

 Who knows what will happen? Perhaps he’ll die, maybe he’ll discover something in himself he never knew before that others can use, and maybe – though highly unlikely – he’ll win. 
Bibliography
Foucault M. and Faubion J.D. (editor) (1994). Michel Foucault: Power. Edition Gallimard.